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was "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." Idaho Code § 
This previously, holding that it means employees 
may file claims in court only when an employer or its agents "physically and offensively or hostilely 
attacked the employee" with "an intention to injure the employee." Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 
755, 757-58 (1988); see also DeAfoss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176 (1990). Idaho's 1s 
also consistent with the vast majority of other states, which have adopted the same rule. 
Plaintiffs now try to persuade this Court to disregard the plain language of the statute, discard 
decades-long, settled Idaho precedent, and depart from the majority rule in the United 
1 
to injure them. 





Rule. The Court should decline 
Plaintiffs' request. The worker's compensation law is clear as to the conduct required before an 
employee can bring a lawsuit for workplace injuries, and this Court's precedent interpreting the statute 
is equally clear. 
It likely has not escaped the Court's notice that this appeal is the second appeal now pending 
before the Court brought by Hecla employees injured on the job and seeking to enlarge the exception 






11, Vol. 1, pp. 1 
complaint on 12, 2014. On May 29, 2015, after discovery, 
provides that sole recourse is compensation (R. 1, 
pp. 146-168) On June 15, 2015, Plaintiffs cross-moved for partial slUllillary judgment, seeking a 
ruling that the Exclusivity Rule does not apply to their claims. (R. Vol. 3-4, pp. 728-772) 
On August 28, 2015, the district court entered an order granting Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs' cross-motion. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 1148-1160) Relying on this 
Court's decisions in Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755 (1988) and DeMoss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 





1 15. p. 11 
on 15. 1 
it nr,c,c,c,n"tc are more 
basis to affirm district court's judgment. to Plaintiffs' 
misrepresentation of 
1. The Uncontested Facts 
Hecla owns and operates the Lucky Friday Mine, which is one of the deepest underground 
in the United States, located in Idaho's Silver Valley. (R. 1, p. 21 
Although it is called the Lucky Friday Mine, Hecla has not mined the Lucky Friday vein-that is, the 
thin vertical ribbon of valuable ore embedded in the rock after which the 
than a decade. (R. Vol. 3, p. 618) Rather, for the years, the Lucky Mine been 
4 
two to 





and had a center that was large enough that vehicles could pass through as went 
the mine shaft, a mile 
(Bayer Deel.)) This was called 
through to the far 
5900 pillar. (Id) 
of the Gold Hunter vein. (R. Vol. 1, p. 170 
The 5900 pillar was planned and maintained by Hecla \vith expert help. During the planning 
of the pillar in 2004, Hecla retained consulting engineers to model the mining that would occur, so as 
1 Doug Bayer was, in December 2011, the Superintendent of the Lucky Friday Mine. (R. Vol. 1, 
p. 169 (Bayer Deel.)) Prior to that, he was the mine's Foreman and Chief Engineer. (Id.) He has 
a Bachelor of Science degree in mining engineering and, as of 2011, had 25 years' m 










(Id. at 172) 
Rehabilitation Plan. (R. Vol. 1, p. 
2 Dr. Blake has a Ph.D. in mining engineering, and had, as of 2011, 45 years' experience in mining 
engineering. (R. Vol. 1, p. 143 (Blake Aff.)) 
3 Dr. Board has a Ph.D. in geological engineering, and 40 years of experience in underground 
mines. (R. Vol. 5, p. 997 (Board Deel.)) 
4 A rock burst is "a sudden and violent failure of overstressed rock resulting in the instantaneous 






wall. (R. 1, p. 13:1 1 During first 
noticed some popping cracking sounds and minor dribbling from the rock walls. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 
(Blake Dep. 18-85:9); R. Vol. 4, p. 827 (Williams Aff.)) sounds are a normal 
occurrence at the mine, and do not typically foreshadow an upcoming event. (R. Vol. 1, p. 203 (Blake 
Dep. 80: 11-81: 7) )5 Further, the reason the Rehabilitation Plan was being implemented was to address 
5 Dr. Blake testified further that such noises and dribbling are "very typical in deep underground 
mines," and "a normal consequence of advancing an opening in stressed ground," which is what 
the miners were doing in first phase of the Rehabilitation Plan. (R. Vol. 1, p. 203 (Blake Dep. 
80:13-14 81:2-3)) Dr. Blake testified that such phenomena are not unexpected: "It's when it 
7 
to 
that and it's kind 
indication that it's time to get 
that this used to old an 
(R. Vol. I, p. 203 (Blake Dep. 81:4-7)) 
6 The original plan called for Hecla to install six new stress gauges. (R. Vol. 1, p. 240 (Bayer Dep. 
54: 13-16)) Hecla had only three in its possession, which it installed, and then it ordered three 
more. (Id. (55:4-6)) Plaintiffs assert that "Hecla never installed the three remaining gauges" (App. 
Brief p. 10), but they ignore the evidence they elicited that Hecla ultimately realized that the 
gauges were installed between the wall and the tunnel liner, they would not be accessible in the 
future. (R. Vol. 1, p. 241 (Bayer Dep. 59:20-22)) As a result, Hecla changed the plan, and notified 
MSHA that it would install the three additional gauges just outside the tunnel liner once the liner 
was installed. (Id. (59: l 19)) So, the three final gauges were not installed, but only because the 
installation of the liner was not completed. (Id. ( 59:24-60: l) ("So it didn't matter if 




installing tunnel li..'1er. (Jd.) He observed no in the that had been applied 
phase of the Rehabilitation Plan or any other changes to the walls or ceilii1-g of the 5900 pillar-
or anything that would suggest pillar was (Jd) 
However, at 7:40 pm on December 14, 2011, a rock burst occurred in the 5900 pillar. (R. Vol. 
1, p. 23 (Compl. ,r 26)) Plaintiffs suffered injuries in the rock burst. (Jd.) In addition to Plaintiffs, a 
member of Heda's management team, Geoff Parker, was in the 5900 pillar and was injured. (Sup. 
R., p. 7 (Amended Bayer Deel.)) Because Hecla had stopped mining activities nearly 24 hours earlier, 
it is clear that mining activities did not cause the rock burst. (R. Vol. 5, p. 1003 (Board Deel.) ("The 
blasting associated the rnining cycle behveen 
9 
to 




First, Plaintiffs assert that Friday Mine was particularly susceptible to 
given its high quartzite rock properties," citing the deposition testimony of Heda's consultant, 
(App. p. 2) Gold 
Hunter vein, not the Lucky Friday vein, which is located one mile away. (See supra at 5) As Dr. 
Blake testified at the very pages Plaintiffs cite, "the Gold Hunter is much more-less burst-much 
burst prone than the actual Lucky Friday Mine." (R. Vol. 1, 191 (Blake Dep. 30:9-11)) 
7 Plaintiffs argue that the rock burst was caused by mining activities (App. Brief pp. 12-13), but 
the only evidence they cite in support of this assertion is R. 488, which says nothing of the sort. 











Vol. 1, p. 32 (Compl. , a burst A failure is different 
a rock burst, as Dr. Board, a in geological engineering, swore under oath. (R. Vol. 5, p. 999 
(Board Deel.) ("There is a distinction between a pillar failure and a rockburst. 
This is not a technical distinction: Whereas pillar failures can sometimes be predicted in 
advance, "[a] rockburst is an unpredictable event of rock failure associated with either movement on 
pre-existing discontinuities within the rock mass or from localized failure of brittle, intact, rock." (R. 
Vol. 5, p. 999 (Board Deel.)) Thus, the stress gauges that feature prominently in Plaintiffs' brief are 
irrelevant to the rock burst that actually caused Plaintiffs' injuries, because gauges "cannot be used to 
11 
not even support 
never was a 
stress 
see 
Board reviewed the stress measurements and concluded that 
readings that were do not 
of the 5900 drift pillar and certainly are not predictive of the rockburst of December 14, 2011." (R. 
Vol. 5, p. 1000 (Board Deel.)) Plaintiffs put the stress measurements before the Court, hoping the 
8 To be clear, the stress gauges did not show signs of a coming pillar failure either. Dr. Board 
offered a sworn statement that, contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, the readings from the stress 
gauges in the 5900 pillar "do not show an increase in stress that would be predictive of the failure 






was not a current risk, given the 
did not did not 
become an actual problem.) Regardless, however one interprets Dr. Blake's statement about 
9 Although Plaintiffs note that the stress readings showed "an increase in 1000 psi in just two 
weeks (App. Brief pp. 9, 32), they neglect to explain the baseline stress levels on the pillar, so that 
the Court has context to understand the seemingly large increase. With good reason: When put in 
context, 1,000 psi is not a large increase. Rather, the record indicates that the baseline stress levels 
on the pillar were "about 12 to 16,000 psi and about 9 - 11,000 psi." (R. Vol. 5, p. 1028) Thus, a 
1,000 increase in psi represents only a 6% to 11 % increase. 
13 
Q. Okay. So you saw updates "''"'"._,.._,LL,,,F, 
monitoring 
A. 






stress levels as 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 258 (Bayer Dep. 128:6-15))10 And as to the consultant, Plaintiffs concede that he 
received "four to five days of monitoring gauge readings." (App. Brief p. 9) Given that the daily 
10 Plaintiffs emphasize that Bayer testified that he is not a specialist in rock mechanics. (App. 
Brief pp. 4, 33-34) Plaintiffs omit that Bayer also testified that, although he is not a specialist, he 







to occur for not 
statements were 
to a1nount now 
significantly reduced" 2, 303), that "the occurrence of large in this 
pillar is unlikely." (Id. at 304) Further, Hecla provided the stress measurements themselves to MSHA, 
so that MSHA could draw its own conclusions. Vol. 1, p. 252 (Bayer Dep. 104:3-5)) 
Lucky Friday my first job as a -- my title was a senior mine engineer. And one of my 
responsibilities was doing some of the rock mechanics. So I have a fair amount of experience at 
the mine with rock mechanics."); R. Vol. 1, p. 170 (Bayer Deel.) ("I also worked with the Bureau 
of Mines on studies they were doing in rock mechanics.")) Additionally, Bayer has a college 
degree in mining engineering, and formerly served as the mine's Chief Engineer and Foreman. 
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 169-70 (Bayer Deel.)) The allegation that Bayer is not qualified to offer his own 
views on risks in the mine is nonsense. 
15 
accurately, but I believe that the that gauge was not stress." (R. Vol. 
1, 7 (Blake Dep. 135:6-8)) the uniform evidence establishes that Defendants thought (and 
stress was providing accurate readings of the rock at point 
where it was inserted. To be clear, the stress levels at that single point were not representative of the 
wall in general. But Defendants knew that, which is why they installed and monitored multiple 
gauges, and why they discounted the readings from the third gauge. (R. Vol. 1, p. 217 (Blake Dep. 
135:4) ("I discounted the gauge.")) This is not evidence of malfeasance; it is evidence that Defendants 
were being careful, with multiple redundancies and a sophisticated understanding of the technology 
and the mine. 
16 
is borderline on mmmg 
that it \:\'aS 
is not: 
IS 
means it must 
access 
sentence. Thus, the of the drafts the sentence they 
was removed was actually added. 11 
But, both versions of the support Rehabilitation Plan. Both opine that 
the Rehabilitation Plan would address the risk present in the 5900 pillar. Specifically, both reports 
say: 
The ground support installed during the rehabilitation of the 5900 pillar will contain 
the damage from any further small bursts that might be induced by continuing 
closure. Installing some type of tunnel sets through this pillar, and isolating them 
11 To be clear, in responding to Plaintiffs' suggestive, leading questions at his deposition, Dr. Blake 






permission for "normal 
on 
activities." that Order)) Second, 
Plaintiffs assert that "MSHA was never informed of the full nature of the u~,~"''M activities during this 
time." (App. Brief p. 12) No evidence supports this assertion either. Rather, Doug Bayer testified 
that he told MSHA that Hecla requested to "resume mining operations and production." (R. Vol. 1, 
p. 253 (Bayer Dep. 108:24-25)) No record evidence contradicts him, and in fact Bayer's statement is 
consistent with MSHA's December 6 approval order. 
* * * 
A fundamental problem vvith Plaintiffs' presentation is that they pretend as though Defendants 





a risk that cannot lS 
of event for which the worker's compensation was created. 
OF 
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same 
as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Estate of Becker 
v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,525 (2004). In the trial court, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 




a physical an to order to the exception to 
Exclusivity Rule, and correctly held further 
suggesting Defendants committed a physical 
Plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence 
A. Plaintiffs Must Show They Were Injured By A Wilful, Physical Attack In 
Order To Satisfy The Exception To The Exclusivity Rule. 
1. This Court's Decisions In Kearney And DeMoss Set Forth The 
Governing For Exception Exclusivity Rule. 
This Court has twice addressed the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. In each 
decision, the Court held that "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" means a physical attack 





statute as an 
hostile attack. Kearney, 114 Idaho at Thus, to invoke the exception, an must 
have "evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack." Id. The Court held further that "[i]t is not 
sufficient to prove that the alleged committed even if those acts "made it 
substantially certain that injury would occur." Id. (emphasis added). A,_pplying this principle, the 
Court explained that "[t]here was no evidence presented to the trial court in this case that the employer 
wilfully or without provocation physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee. Id. 
Consequently, "the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment against the employee." Id. 




to cut a 
so, a 
no 
to work insulation. Id. Only 





did the employees find out they had 
argued that the defendants "knew the 
'lied' to the 
appellants by not telling them it was asbestos; and that the defendants failed to provide adequate 
12 Plaintiffs' description of DeMoss conveniently ignores this lie by the employer, which is 
significant given Plaintiffs' accusations that Defendants lied to them and to MSHA. (App. Brief 
pp. 21-22) Here, Defendants deny Plaintiffs' allegations (and submit that the record supports 
them), but the point is that, even if Plaintiffs are correct, their claim would still be foreclosed by 
DeMoss, which found such lies insufficient 
unprovoked physical aggression' as required § 







and thus the plaintiffs' state tort 
" Id. And the Court further held: "To 
'""''t"'r"'t" what we said in Kearney v. Denker, 'It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor 
committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur."' Id. It affirmed 
summary judgment for the defendants. Id. 
Thus, this Court has been clear, and the question has been settled for more than 25 years, that 







must be a "deliberate infliction of to an intentional jab to the 
For instance, in Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989), the Alaska 
Court airline 
13 Larson's has been cited repeatedly by this Court as authoritative on worker's compensation 
issues. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 338 (2015); Corgatelli 
v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 293 (2014); Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. #401, 147 
Idaho 285-86 (2009). Larson's has also been held out as authoritative by other state supreme 
cmuts. See, e.g., Helf v. Chevron US.A., Inc., 361 P.3d 63, 82 (Utah 2015) (describing Larson's 
as a "leading commentator"); State Farm A1utual Auto. Ins. v. Wilson, 199 P.3d 581, 590 (Alaska 
2008) (referring to Larson's as "a leading text"); Kawakami v. City and County of Honolulu, 59 
P.3d 920, 924 (Haw. 2002) (referring to Larson's as "the leading treatise on worker's 
compensation"); Brittingham v. St. Michael's Rectory, 788 A.2d 519, 523 (Del. 2002) (referring 






""'".,.""mp, Court heard an UIJ!-lvU.l 
~·c,b"'b collapsed. 




claim by the was killed when a 
the collapse, the Occupational Health Safety 
citations" including "failing to provide 
a ladder to escape the trench; for failure to have a competent person conduct daily inspection of trench; 
and for not taking adequate safety precautions for a trench over five feet deep." Id. at 16 & n.4. The 
case was tried to a jury, which detennined that the employer had caused the employee's death through 
"deliberate intention." Id. at 14. 
Despite the jury's verdict, the court held that the evidence did not satisfy the exception to the 







to a safe 
of equipment" Id. at 160. 
court exception to 
Rule. It first explained that "there is a split of authority as to how to judge an employer's conduct and 
two rules have emerged: the intentional tort doctrine followed by the majority of states and the 
substantial certainty doctrine that is followed by only a few states."14 Rafferty, 760 at 159-60. 
14 The substantial certainty rule was endorsed by Justice Huntley, who concurred in Kearney. See 





had been gram ground around 
auger, such that people coming near it could easily slip fall into it. Id. employee alleged that 
employer's actions were direct violation and state statutes and regulations," 
the employer "could have easily been corrected by installation of a protective covering over the 
opening." Id. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that "the employer was aware that this condition was 
hazardous and dangerous to its employees and recognized the substantial certainty that it would result 
Id. at 757 ("It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that 








1s m accord with this Court's decisions in Kearney Stat. 
§ 1022 ( exclusivity rule applies unless the employee was to act done knowingly 
and purposely with the direct object of injuring another."); Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc., 
30 P.3d 57, 60 (Cal. 2001) (holding that "intended injurious conduct" is required to satisfy the 
exception to the exclusivity rule); Schwindt v. Hershey Foods Corp., 81 P.3d 1144, 1147 (Colo. 
App. 2003) ("We agree with the analysis in the Larson's treatise and decline to adopt the 
'substantial certainty' approach taken by a minority of the courts."); Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 
569 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) ("we hold that plaintiff is required to allege defendants 
had the specific intent to injure."); Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 
(Ind. 1994) ("nothing short of deliberate intent to inflict an injury, or actual knowledge that an 
injury is certain to occur, will suffice"); Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 503 A.2d 708, 711-12 (Md. 
Ct. App. 1986) (to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires "an intentional or 
deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act"); Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 418.131 ( exception to the exclusivity rule satisfied only when "the employer 
specifically intended an injury"); Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695, 703 (Minn. 2001) 
(the employee must identify evidence the employer "consciously and deliberately intended to 
injure" in order to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule); Bowden v. Young, 120 So.3d 971, 
982 (Miss. 2013) ("the plaintiff must show actual intent to injure the employee"); Light v. JC 






the term not to 1 6) 
long as the employer does not intentionally injure employee"); Harris v. State, 294 P.3d 
382,386 (Mont. 2013) (an employee must show "an intentional and deliberate act specifically and 
actually intended to cause injUiry"); Conway v. Circus Casinos, Inc., 8 P.3d 837, 840 (Nev. 2000) 
(requiring that the employer "deliberately and specifically intended to injure them"); Pereira v. St. 
Joseph's Cemetery, 54 AD.3d 835, 836-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("the conduct must be engaged 
in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the act; a mere knowledge and appreciation 
of a risk is not the same as the intent to cause injury"); N.D. Cent. Code§ 65-01-01.1 (employer's 
action must be taken "'with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury"); Kaminski v. 1t1etal & 
Wire Prods., 927 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Ohio 2010) ("the only way an employee can recover is if the 
employer acted with intent to cause injury"); Peay v. US. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64 (S.C. 1993) 
(enforcing intentional tort doctrine, and refusing to adopt substantial certainty doctrine); Valencia 
v. Freeland & Lemm Constr. Co., 108 S.W.3d 239, 243 (Tenn. 2003) (requiring "actual intent to 
injure"); Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 109 P.3d 805,810 (Wash. 2005) ("Even 
failure to observe safety laws or procedures does not constitute specific intent to injure, nor does 
an act that had only substantial certainty of producing injury."). 
29 
it means is not 
at 
V. 
not is not 
inasmuch as '"wilful' connotes deliberation or determined and stubborn 
" (R. Vol. 3, p. 5 31 ( emphasis added)) Thus, 1'v1r. Smith did not argue that "wilful" means 
a standard lower he argued that 
required for an act to be willful. Thus, the supposed legislative history submitted by Plaintiffs 
supports Defendants' position, not Plaintiffs'. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the fact that the Legislature has an1ended various parts of the worker's 
compensation law since adding the exception to the Exclusivity Rule in 1972 supports their argument 
that the Legislature with Plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute. (App. Brief p. 17) To the 




was intended to mean "something more 




less than to 
decisions explaining that the 
the phrase "vvillful and wanton" 
does not appear in the worker's compensation law; rather, the term "wilful" does, by itself. As this 
Court has previously explained when the Legislature used the same term in different places, if the 
Legislature intended different meanings, it would have used different terms. See, e.g., Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 211 (2003) ("Fundamentally, if the legislature had intended LC. 





Blaine School District, 15 8 Idaho 24 2 (2015) ( discussed at App. 






17-18) that the term 
Plaintiffs here. The 
same is true of Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266 (1988) ( discussed at App. Brief p. 18), 
which also discussed the term "wilful or wanton." Id. at 270-71. 
If the Court were to look to prior precedent interpreting other uses of the terms that appear in 
the worker's compensation law, it should look to instances where the term "wilful" appears alone, 
without "wanton." This happens often, and this Court has interpreted '\:vilful" to mean an intentional 









and speaks volumes. As is true that LC. § 
does not use the phrase 'intentional act,' but it does use the phrase 'willful physical aggression.' 
is hard to put [sic] to explain how an act willful physical aggression is not an intentional act." 
(R. Vol. 5, p. 1158)16 
16 Once the district court held, based on Kearney and DeAfoss, that intent to injure was required, it 
looked to (among other things) three non-Idaho decisions that supported its conclusion that 
Plaintiffs have not established a genuine dispute whether Defendants acted with intent to injure 
thern. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 1156-58) Plaintiffs criticize this reliance, arguing that the decisions do not 
establish that the exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires intent to injure. (App. Brief pp. 27-
28) But that is not why the district court relied on thern. Rather, it relied on thern in assessing 







at 11. to 
it was "inconsistent to continue to claim was of an intentional 
tort." Id. However, the Court disagreed, holding that "an employee is not required to forgo the filing 
a worker's compensation claim in order to sue his employer or physical 
aggression." Id. at 12. 
Thus, Dominguez did not address the question already answered by Kearney and De111oss 
regarding the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. Indeed, contrary to Plaintiffs' description 
of the decision, Dominguez explicitly refused to review the merits of the plaintiff's claim. As the 
establish an intention to injure. The district court's decision that Plaintiffs have no facts suggesting 




as true because defaulted-that employer steel 
tank, but concealed that fact from Dominguez." Id. After entering the Mr. 
17 Plaintiffs argue that Dominguez must have spoken to whether the plaintiffs allegations satisfied 
the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, because, even in the event of a default judgment, the factual 
allegations "still had to form the basis for a valid claim for relief." (App. Brief p. 24) But in 
making this argument, Plaintiffs simply ignore what this Court said-namely, that it would not 
review the merits of the case. Plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that this Court reached a conclusion 
it did not actually reach. Plaintiffs' reliance on In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) 
is even further afield. That decision, from a federal bankruptcy court, involved the same litigants 
as Dominguez and addressed the question whether the judgment of the district court in Dominguez 
was dischargeable in the employer's bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 902. In analyzing that question, 
the court held that the judgment in Dominguez had a preclusive effect on the issue of whether the 
defendants acted with "an extremely harmful state of mind." Id. at 912. It said nothing about this 












c.,~,+,+lfr still could not satisfy 
DeMoss Were Correctly Decided. 
In addition to being the settled law of this State and representative of the majority 
IS 
across 
the United States, Kearney and DeMoss were rightly decided. The minority view-the substantial 
certainty test-would not be faithful to the language ofldaho's worker's compensation law, and also 
would disturb the balance between employees and employers that is inherent in the worker's 
compensation system. 
First, Kearney and De}vfoss were rightly decided because they were true to the statutory 





is not the only reason: Another purpose return to 
protect industry by providing a limit on liability." Id., see also 9 Larson s Workers' 
Compensation Law§ 103.03 (explaining that one of the Rule is 
"to minimize litigation, even litigation of undoubted merit"). 
Adopting the substantial certainty test would undo the limits on employer liability-
including, significantly, the limits on litigation expenses. As a practical matter, in almost any tort 
case, a plaintiff can allege negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness. The difference between 
them is not easily resolved without trial. As a result, if recklessness could satisfy the exception to the 
Exclusivity Rule, Lhe number of lawsuits against employers could rise dramatically, as would the 
37 
no to 
as Kearney, even if Defendants' actions made it substantially certain that injury would occur 
implementing the Rehabilitation Plan-which, to be clear, there is no evidence \Ji "'"L• would not 
be enough. And, as DeJ\,foss, even if Defendants knew the 5900 pillar was unsafe-which, again, 
there is no evidence of-that is not enough. Rather, this Court has been clear: The exception to the 
Exclusivity Rule applies only when an employer or its agents physically attack an employee with 
intent to injure him. Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757 (a defendant must "wilfully or without provocation 
physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee"). There is no evidence of that here, 





2-13, were aware stress 
concluded that the 
at 3, Plaintiffs' 
18 do offer the affidavits of two experts, who opine that Defendants' conduct was 
"willful" and with "deliberate intent." (App. Brief pp. 35-38) Such "expert" opinions are plainly 
inadmissible, even on a motion for summary judgment. As this Court explained in Athay v. Stacey, 
142 Idaho 360 (2005), an expert's opinions regarding mental state are inadmissible. Specifically, 
in Athay the Court considered an expert's opinion that the defendants' conduct constituted 
"reckless disregard." Id. at 366. The Court held the opinion inadmissible for two reasons: First, 
"there is no indication that the expert knew the standard in Idaho for reckless disregard." Id. at 
367. Rather, "[w]ithout defining what he understood the standard to be, he simply stated several 
times throughout his affidavits that the [defendants'] conduct constituted reckless disregard." Id. 
Second, "reckless disregard includes the element that the [defendant] actually perceived the high 
degree of manifest danger and continued his course of conduct." Id. "The [plaintiffs'] expert is 
no more qualified than the average juror to draw conclusions from the evidence regarding what 
any of the Defendants actually perceived or understood." Id. at 368. Here, Plaintiffs' experts' 
opinions are foreclosed by both of Athay's reasons. First, Plaintiffs' experts opined on the relevant 
legal standard without any indication they understand what the standard means. Second, Plaintiffs' 
experts are no more qualified to draw conclusions from the evidence about intent than a jury would 







ex,cermcm to was no 
or attack against employee. Kearney, 114 Idaho at 
Similarly, in DeMoss, the employer sent employees to work \vith what it knew might be 
It made no to investigate an suspicion that it was asbestos. See supra at 
22-23. Then, after the employer received confirmation of asbestos, it again sent the employees to 
work with the material-this time knowing it was asbestos, lying to the employees by telling them it 
was something harmless, and providing the employees with minimal safety clothing (paper coveralls 
and masks). Id. Again, although the employer was alleged to have sent employees into a known risky 





IS to risk not statute. 
Plaintiffs cannot on statements by 
statements. was ) JS 
p. it 
on assessment 
that the to address that was the very Rehabilitation that 
,~~,··~·~ were implementing when they were injured. When considered in context, it is clear that 
Hecla advice that it should proceed the Rehabilitation Plan. 
2. Conducting Mining Activities Is Not A Physical Attack \Vith Intent 
To Injure. 
As explained above, the evidence demonstrates that Heda's mining activities between the first 
and second phases of the Rehabilitation Plan did not cause the December 14 rock burst. See supra at 
11. But, even if they did, that would not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule because even 
Plaintiffs do not allege that Hecla engaged in mining activities intending to injure them. At best for 
41 
to That is m 
to Plaintiffs 
7-12) 
IS support in the record assertion. at 6. But even if are 
correct, the allegations would not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. 
First, lying to MSHA is wholly irrelevant. In no way could that constitute an offensive or 
hostile physical attack on Plaintiffs. This is true primarily because lying to MSHA does not involve 
Plaintiffs. But it is also true because it is not a physical action, and it is not an attack. 
Second, lying to Plaintiffs themselves would not satisfy the statute either, because it would 
not constitute a physical attack. For instarice, in De1\4oss, the employer eventually tested the substance 
insulating the boiler and determined that it was indeed asbestos. See supra at 22-23. After it received 
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